Airbnb is not required to hold an estate agent’s professional licence as it did not notify the Commission of that requirement in accordance with the Directive on electronic commerce
ECJ: Airbnb case- France cannot require Airbnb to hold an
estate agent’s professional licence as it did not notify the Commission of that
requirement in accordance with the Directive on electronic commerce.
By its judgment of 19 December 2019, Airbnb Ireland (C-390/18), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice held, first, that an intermediation service which, by means of an electronic platform, is intended to connect, for remuneration, potential guests with professional or non-professional hosts offering short-term accommodation services, while also providing a certain number of services ancillary to that intermediation service, must be classified as an ‘information society service’ under Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce.[1]
By its judgment of 19 December 2019, Airbnb Ireland (C-390/18), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice held, first, that an intermediation service which, by means of an electronic platform, is intended to connect, for remuneration, potential guests with professional or non-professional hosts offering short-term accommodation services, while also providing a certain number of services ancillary to that intermediation service, must be classified as an ‘information society service’ under Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce.[1]
Secondly, the Court found that, in criminal
proceedings with an ancillary civil action, an individual may oppose the
application to him or her of measures of a Member State restricting the freedom
to provide such a service which that individual provides from another Member
State, where those measures were not notified in accordance with the second
indent of Article 3(4)(b) of that directive.
The dispute in the main proceedings
concerns criminal proceedings brought in France following a complaint, together
with an application to be joined as a civil party to the proceedings, lodged
against Airbnb Ireland by the Association pour un hébergement et un tourisme
professionnels (Association for professional tourism and accommodation, AHTOP).
Airbnb Ireland is an Irish company that manages an electronic platform which,
in return for payment of a commission, makes it possible to establish contact,
particularly in France, between professional hosts and private individuals
offering short-term accommodation services and people looking for such
accommodation.
In addition, Airbnb Ireland offers those hosts
ancillary services, such as a format for setting out the content of their
offer, civil liability insurance, a tool for estimating their rental price or
payment services for the provision of those services. AHTOP which lodged the
complaint against Airbnb Ireland maintained that that company did not merely
connect two parties through its platform of the same name; it also acted as an
estate agent without holding a professional licence, in breach of the act known
as the ‘Hoguet Law’ which applies to the activities of real estate
professionals in France.
For its part, Airbnb claimed that, on any
view, Directive 2000/31 precluded that legislation. Asked about the
classification of the intermediation service provided by Airbnb Ireland, the
Court pointed out, referring to the judgment in Asociación Profesional Elite
Taxi, [2] that if an
intermediation service satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 1(1)(b) of
Directive 2015/1535,[3] to which Article
2(a) of Directive 2000/31 refers, then, in principle, it is an ‘information
society service’, distinct from the subsequent service to which it relates.
However, this will not be the case if it
appears that that intermediation service forms an integral part of an overall
service whose main component is a service coming under another legal
classification. In the present case, the Court found that an intermediation
service such as that provided by Airbnb Ireland satisfied those conditions, and
the nature of the links between the intermediation service and the provision of
accommodation did not justify departing from the classification of that
intermediation service as an ‘information society service’ and thus the
application of Directive 2000/31 to that service.
To underline the separate nature of such an
intermediation service in relation to the accommodation services to which it
relates, the Court noted, first, that that service is not aimed only at
providing immediate accommodation services, but rather it consists essentially
of providing a tool for presenting and finding accommodation for rent, thereby
facilitating the conclusion of future rental agreements.
Therefore, that type of service cannot be
regarded as being merely ancillary to an overall accommodation service. Second,
the Court pointed out that an intermediation service, such as the one provided
by Airbnb Ireland, is in no way indispensable to the provision of accommodation
services, since the guests and hosts have a number of other channels in that
respect, some of which are long-standing.
Finally, third, the Court stated that there
was nothing in the file to indicate that Airbnb sets or caps the amount of the
rents charged by the hosts using that platform. The Court further stated that
the other services offered by Airbnb Ireland do not call that finding into
question, since the various services provided are merely ancillary to the
intermediation service provided by that company.
In addition, it stated that, unlike the
intermediation services at issue in the judgments in Asociación Profesional
Elite Taxi and Uber France, [4] neither that
intermediation service nor the ancillary services offered by Airbnb Ireland
make it possible to establish the existence of a decisive influence exercised
by that company over the accommodation services to which its activity relates,
with regard both to determining the rental price charged and selecting the
hosts or accommodation for rent on its platform.
In addition, the Court examined whether
Airbnb Ireland may, in the main proceedings, oppose the application to that
company of a law restricting the freedom to provide information society
services provided by an operator from another Member State, such as the Hoguet
Law, on the ground that that law was not notified by France in accordance with
the second indent of Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/31.
The Court stated that the fact that that
law predates the entry into force of Directive 2000/31 cannot have had the
consequence of freeing France of its notification obligation. Next, drawing on
the reasoning followed in the judgment in CIA Security International,[5] it found that
that obligation, which constitutes a substantial procedural requirement, must
be recognised as having direct effect.
It therefore concluded that a Member
State’s failure to fulfil its obligation to give notification of such a measure
may be relied on by an individual, not only in criminal proceedings brought
against that individual, but also in a claim for damages brought by another
individual who has been joined as civil party. (curia.europa.eu)
________________________
[1] Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (‘the Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1).
[1] Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (‘the Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1).
[2] Judgment 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi
(C-434/15); see also Press Release No. 136/17.
[3] Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in
the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services
(OJ 2015 L 241, p. 1)
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