Indefinite retention of DNA, fingerprints and photograph of man convicted of drink driving breached his privacy rights
An important decision was issued recently by the European
Court of Human Rights regarding the indefinite retention of personal data (DNA
profile, fingerprints and photograph) of a man who had a spent conviction for
driving with excess alcohol in Northern Ireland.
In the case Gaughran v. the United Kingdom (application no.
45245/15) the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The Court underlined that it was not the duration of the
retention of data that had been decisive, but the absence of certain
safeguards. In the applicant’s case his personal data had been retained
indefinitely without consideration of the seriousness of his offence, the need
for indefinite retention and without any real possibility of review.
Noting that the technology being used had been shown to be
more sophisticated than that considered by the domestic courts in this case,
particularly regarding storage and analysis of photographs, the Court
considered that the retention of the applicant’s data had failed to strike a
fair balance between the competing public and private interests.
The facts
The applicant is a British national who was born in 1972 and
lives in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom. He was arrested in October 2008 for
driving with excess alcohol (an offence punishable by imprisonment, known as a
“recordable offence”). He was taken to the police station where he provided a
breath sample, which came up positive.
The police also took his photograph, fingerprints and a DNA
sample. He later pleaded guilty, was given a fine and banned from driving for
12 months. His conviction was spent in 2013. His DNA sample was destroyed in
2015 at his request.
The Police Service of Northern Ireland (“the PSNI”)
continues to retain on an indefinite basis the DNA profile (digital data)
extracted from his DNA sample, his fingerprints and photograph. The applicant
unsuccessfully challenged the PSNI’s continued retention of his data in the
domestic courts.
Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and
family life), the applicant complained about the police retaining his DNA
profile, fingerprints and photograph indefinitely and without any possibility
of meaningful review .
Court’s Decision
The Court found that the retention of the applicant’s DNA
profile, fingerprints and photograph amounted to an interference with his
private life which had pursued the legitimate purpose of the detection, and
therefore, prevention of crime.
It emphasised the importance of examining privacy rights
where the powers vested in the State were obscure and where the technology
available was continually becoming more sophisticated. For example, the
technology regarding photographs and facial mapping had already moved on since
the case had been examined by the domestic courts.
It went on to examine whether the interference in the
applicant’s privacy rights had been justified, reiterating that the national
authorities had to be given leeway (“margin of appreciation”) when making that
assessment. A strong consensus in the member States’ approach to retaining data
of those convicted of an offence would narrow that margin of appreciation.
The Court considered that the majority of member States had
regimes which put a time-limit on retaining the biometric data, that is,
fingerprints and DNA profiles, of convicted persons. The UK was one of the few
Council of Europe jurisdictions to permit indefinite retention of DNA profiles.
The margin of appreciation, in particular in respect of DNA profiles, had
therefore been narrowed.
The Court underlined though that the duration of the
retention was not conclusive in assessing whether a State had overstepped the
acceptable margin of appreciation in establishing its retention regime. There was not the same risk of
stigmatisation in retaining the data as in S. and Marper v. the UK, which had
concerned individuals suspected of offences but not convicted. What was
decisive was the existence and functioning of safeguards.
Having
chosen to allocate itself the most extensive power of indefinite retention, the
State had put itself at the limit of the margin of appreciation. So, it had to
ensure that certain safeguards were present and effective for the applicant.
However, the applicant’s biometric data and photographs had been retained
without reference to the seriousness of his offence and without regard to any
continuing need to retain that data indefinitely.
Moreover,
the police in Northern Ireland were only empowered to delete biometric data and
photographs in exceptional circumstances. Therefore the applicant could not
request a review of the retention of his data, as there was no provision
permitting deletion if conserving the data no longer appeared necessary in view
of the nature of his offence, his age, or the time that had elapsed and his
current personality.
The Court
found that the nature of those powers failed to strike a fair balance between
the competing public and private interests. The respondent State had therefore
overstepped the acceptable margin of appreciation and the retention at issue
constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to
respect for private life, which could not be regarded as necessary in a
democratic society. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
The Court
held that the finding of a violation was in itself sufficient just satisfaction
for any non-pecuniary damage sustained.
(source: ECHR / photo: pixabay)
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